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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
If this is what the opinion stands for, it would have been more
useful to clearly state that fact. As matters stand, it appears just as
reasonable to assume that at least some courts will not interpret this to be
the case. This could result in an effort toward analogy likely to be less
successful than if the Court had chosen to more completely assess all
factors in the balance in order to purposefully form a groundwork for
future decisions. As the law cannot provide a remedy for every wrong, the
Court may be justified in concluding that there cannot be a predictable
methodology for every area of the law in which remedies are afforded.
It is submitted, however, that to disguise that position does not aid in
the making of what are already exceptionally difficult decisions.
Michael G. Trachtman
PATENT LAW - LICENSE AGREEMENTS - ROYALTIES PAID ARE NOT
RECOVERABLE BY LICENSEE UPON SHOWING OF PATENT INVALIDITY.
Troxel Manufacturing Co. v. Schwinn
Bicycle Co. (6th Cir. 1972)
In 1966, appellant Schwinn Bicycle Co. was issued a design patent
covering a bicycle seat and strut assembly.' The following year, Schwinn
notified the Troxel Manufacturing Company that the design for bicycle
seats manufactured and sold by Troxel infringed upon the Schwinn
patent. A non-exclusive license agreement was subsequently negotiated
by Troxel and Schwinn, exculpating Troxel from the alleged past in-
fringement and fixing a per-unit schedule for royalties due upon future
manufacture. 2
Later, in accord with this agreement, Troxel notified Schwinn that
the patent was infringed by bicycle seats being sold by the Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company. 3 In January, 1969, Schwinn's infringement suit
against Goodyear resulted in a finding by the district court of patent
invalidity.4 Immediately thereafter, Troxel notified Schwinn of its in-
1. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 U.S.P.Q. 587
(N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd 444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1970). The patent was Design Patent
No. 204,121, issued March 15, 1966 to Schwinn as an assignee. Application had been
made on January 15, 1965. Id. at 587.
2. Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253, 1254 (6th Cir.
1972). The royalty rate was a low 5 cents per unit. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 300 (9th Cir. 1970).
3. Schwinn was obligated under the license contract to enforce the patent
against infringers. 465 F.2d at 1254.
4. The patent was held invalid since the invention had been substantially
described in an advertisement more than one year prior to the date of application
for the patent. Also, the invention failed to meet the requirement for patentability
that it not be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter
pertained. 160 U.S.P.Q. at 588. See U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1970).
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tention to escrow royalties accruing during Schwinn's appeal of the dis-
trict court's finding of invalidity. However, upon Schwinn's initiation of
an action for the escrowed funds, Troxel made full payment of accrued
royalties and agreed to continue making payments. 5 In 1970 the district
court decision was affirmed" and Schwinn released its licensees from pay-
ment of royalties becoming due after the date of affirmance. 7 Three
months later, Troxel commenced the instant suit seeking recovery of all
royalties paid or, in the alternative, recovery of royalties which had
accrued after the district court found the patent. invalid.8
The district court, relying upon the landmark United States Supreme
Court decision of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,9 found the overriding federal
policy in favor of the public use of properly unpatentable ideas controlling
when royalties once paid are sought to be recovered after a showing of
patent invalidity.' 0 Accordingly, summary judgment was granted Troxel
for all royalties paid." On appeal the iSixth: Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that once a patent is declared. invalid, the
disenfranchised patentee is not required to refund all royalties collected
under a licensing agreement prior to the final adjudication of patent in-
validity. Troxel Manufacturing Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d
1253 (6th Cir. 1972).
Patent law is founded upon article I, section 8, clause 8 of the
United States Constitution, which specifically empowers Congress to
grant patent monopolies for limited periods of time. In accordance with
this constitutional mandate, Congress has enacted legislation designed to
provide a patent system that will best accompli~h-the constitutional direc-
tive "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .... -12
5. 465 F.2d at 1255.
6. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber-Co., 444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir.
1970), aff'g 160 U.S.P.Q. 587 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
7. 465 F.2d at 1255.
8. Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co.; .334- F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Tenn.
1971). Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Id. at 1269. See 28 U.S.C.§§ 1332, 2201, 1665 (1970). See also note 4 supra..
9. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Lear originated as an action by an inventor for
royalties allegedly due under a license agreement. The California Supreme Court held
that since the license agreement was a valid contract, Lear was precluded from
questioning the patent under the doctrine of licensee estoppel. Adkins v. Lear, Inc.,
67 Cal.2d 882, 435P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967). .
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court refused to invoke thelicensee estopped rule in the face of overriding federal policies in favor of free
competition in the use of ideas, and accordingly 1vacated the judgment of the
California Supreme Court and remanded, holding..that if Lear should successfully
attack the validity of the patent, Adkins would not be entitled to recover the unpaid
royalties, even those accruing before the finding -of. patent invalidity. 395 U.S. at
674. See notes 20 & 22 and accompanying text infra.
10. 334 F. Supp. at 1271.
11. In holding that the rationale of Lear required full recovery of royalties paid
on an invalid patent, the district court did not 'consider the merits of Troxel's
alternative claim for recovery of those royalties paid after the district court had
found the patent invalid. That claim was based upon the contract doctrine of eviction
which considers a finding of patent invalidity.'to evict :or void a license agreement
through failure of consideration. Id. at 1272. See nbte 53.and accompanying text infra.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,. cl. 8. The public benefit accruing from the grant
of a patent monopoly results from.the additional incentive to invent, the stimulation
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Patents so granted are considered to have the attributes of personal
property, and may be assigned or licensed, at the option of the patentee.18
The property right of a patent monopoly may be protected from unau-
thorized use by a civil action for infringement. 14 In the case of a
breached license agreement, the patentee licensor may, at his option, sue
for forfeiture of the license, for damages in either an infringement action
or an action on the contract, or for specific performance. 15
In actions to enforce patent rights, the validity of the patent in ques-
tion is presumed. 16 This presumption, however, has been described as "far
from conclusive,"' 7 as the courts have been firm in requiring adherence
to the constitutional requirement that the patent serve a public purpose. 18
A declaration of patent invalidity constitutes an affirmative defense
to an action for infringement or recovery of royalties. 19 The availability
of this defense, however, was, in the past, often precluded by the licensee
estoppel doctrine, which held a licensee estopped from disputing the
validity of the patent he had bargained to utilize. 20
of capital investment in developing the invention provided by the vision of an
exclusive position, and the public disclosure of inventions that might otherwise
remain secret. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM,
"To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS. OF . . . USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING
TECHNOLOGY 2-3 (1966).
13. The monopoly granted runs for a period of 17 years from the date of issuance.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). A design patent, however, granted for the invention of
"any new original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture" may run
no longer than 14 years. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171, 173 (1970). Patent holders utilizing
their patents within the valid scope of the statutory grant risk no antitrust liability.
See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), where the Court stated:
The patent laws which give a 17-year monopoly on "making, using, or selling
the invention" are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and modify them
pro tanto.
Id. at 24.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1970).
15. See 4 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 420 at 699, 702 (2d ed.
1964).
16. The presumption of validity afforded an issued patent is not conclusive,
but merely acts to place "[tlhe burden of establishing invalidity of a patent . . . on
the party asserting it." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
17. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 300
(9th Cir. 1970).
18. See Cuno Engineering. Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. 314 U.S. 84 (1941),
wherein the Court stated:
[A genuine "invention" or "discovery" must be demonstrated] . . . lest in the
constant demand for new appliances the heavy hand of tribute be laid on each
slight technological advance in an art.
Id. at 92. The Supreme Court has criticized the "notorious difference between the
standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts," and has suggested that
the Patent Office more closely conform to the standards of patentability codified in
the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (1970), as interpreted by the courts.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1965). The standards required of a
patentable invention are, in brief, novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101 to 103 (1970). The "notorious difference" has resulted in more than 80
per cent of patent infringement cases ending with a finding of patent invalidity.
Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 17, 31 (1971).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827(1950), expressly overruled Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Before Lear,
the impact of Hazeltine had been severely limited by a series of decisions carving out
exceptions to the licensee estoppel doctrine. See, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson
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The Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 21 however, rejected the
licensee estoppel doctrine, declaring that the strong federal policies favor-
ing free competition in ideas which are not patentable override the tech-
nical requirements of contract doctrine.22  The Lear Court not only
disposed of the procedural rule of licensee estoppel, but also decided that,
contrary to the explicit terms of the license agreement, the licensee need
not tender royalties accruing at least during the time royalties were con-
tested and unpaid before a finding of patent invalidity.2 3
Again, in 1971, the Supreme Court made evident its intention to
keep patent monopolies strictly within their statutory bounds. In Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,24 a licensee
charged with patent infringement was allowed to enter a plea of estoppel
based upon a prior finding between the patentee and a third party licensee
that the patent was invalid. In dismissing the long standing doctrine of
mutuality of estoppel as applied to patent litigation,2 5 the Court noted:
Although recognizing the patent system's desirable stimulus to inven-
tion, we have also viewed the patent as a monopoly which, although
sanctioned by law, has the economic consequences attending other
monopolies. A patent yielding returns for a device that fails to meet
the congressionally imposed criteria of patentability is anomalous. 26
Thus it seems clear that recent Supreme Court decisions invoking anti-
trust concepts and emphasizing the public interest in preserving free
markets have significantly eroded protections once afforded the patentee. 27
Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (licensee estoppel rule inapplicable where license
agreement contains a price fixing agreement); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v.
Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924) (evidence of prior art admissible to limit
proper scope of patent).
21. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
22. Id. at 656, 670. The public interest argument, determinative in Lear, had
been previously utilized by the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225 (1964). In Stiffel, the operation of a state unfair competition law
which prohibited the copying of unpatented articles when public confusion as to the
identity of the producer would result was held invalid as inimical to the federal
policy of insuring the free use of products not protected by a valid patent. Id. at
232-33.
23. 395 U.S. at 673-74.
24. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). For a perceptive analysis of the impact of Blonder-
Tongue on patent law, see Comment, Blonder-Totigue Bites Back: Collateral Estoppel
in Patent Litigation -A New Look, 18 VILL. L. REV. 207 (1972).
25. The leading case expounding the doctrine 'of mutuality of estoppel, Tripplett
v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), was overruled in Blonder-Tongue to the extent that
it foreclosed a plea of estoppel by one facing a charge of infringement of a patent
which had once been declared invalid. 402 U.S. at:350:..
26. 402 U.S. at 343.
27. Other examples of the influence of antitrust considerations on patent law
include the "misuse doctrine" which indicates that a court of equity may deny a
patentee the enforcement of his patent rights if he has used the monopoly power of
his patent to compel purchases in unpatented commodities. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co.
v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).' The enforcement of a patent procured by
intentional fraud may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970),
and subject the patentee to treble. damages. See e.g., Walker, Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). License agreements that include
royalty provisions projecting beyond the expiration date of the patent have been de-
clared per se unlawful. See e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). Mandatory
MAY 1973]
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This was the context then, in which the district court found Lear
to preclude the retention of royalties paid on an invalid patent. The dis-
trict court, in ordering the return of royalties paid under the license
agreement, found the rationale of Lear favoring the free use of un-
patentable ideas and prohibiting the collection of royalties due but unpaid
on an invalid patent to be equally applicable to the case where royalties
are in fact paid and the patent is later held invalid.28
The district court, unmoved by Schwinn's argument that such a rule
would place an oppressive and unfair burden on licensors, noted that they
were in no worse a condition than that which they would have enjoyed
had they not exacted undeserved monopoly profits on an invalid patent
and that they have "at least . . . had the use of the licensee's money. '29
The court found no cause for treating a licensee who had paid royalties
any differently than one who had not.30 Reaching opposite conclusions
and overruling the district court, the Sixth Circuit declared that the
public interest in free markets was sufficiently protected under Lear
without compelling the return of royalties already paid under a license
agreement. 31
The circuit court based this decision on two considerations: (1)
policy - the probable effect of allowing a recovery of royalties already
paid on patent licensing, patent litigation, and the utilization of the patent
system itself by inventors,3 2 and (2) equity - the relative position of the
licensor patentee vis-&-vis his licensee. 83
In analyzing the policy reasoning behind Lear, the circuit court first
acknowledged that the purpose of Lear was to "unmuzzle" licensees, but
also noted that an articulated goal of Lear was to "encourage an early
adjudication of invalidity of patents."3 4 By allowing licensees to recover
past royalties, the court concluded that early litigation of patent validity
would be discouraged because a licensee would be wise to delay in the
hope that another party would assume the initiative and expense of chal-
package licensing may constitute patent misuse. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v.Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). Cross-licensing agreements includingprice provisions have been held per se illegal. See, e.g., United States v. LineMaterial Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
This infusion of antitrust concepts into the law of license agreements, which
was once grounded predominantly on contract and patent law, has led one com-
mentator to observe that: "In a vast sense, patent licensing has become a complicatedbramble-bush in the forest of antitrust law." Austern, Umbras and Penumbras: ThePatent Grant and Antitrust Policy, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1015, 1030 (1965).




31. 465 F.2d at 1260.
32. See text accompanying notes 33 & 34, and note 35 and accompanying textinfra.
33. See note 40 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 41 & 42
infra.
34. Id. at 1257.
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lenging the patent in question. 3 Also, the circuit court noted that margi-
nal litigation of dubious merit relating to patent validity would be
encouraged since a licensee would have little to lose but possibly much
to gain from bringing suit near the end of the licensed patent's term for
royalties paid.3 6 It is submitted, however, that this argument fails to
consider the already significant inhibitory effect, recognized by the
Supreme Court recently in Blonder-Tongue, that the costs of litigation
have upon the pursuance of marginal (and even merited) claims against
patentees.37 Furthermore, an obvious effect of allowing the recovery of
royalties already paid would be to induce the challenging of questionable
patents in situations where the savings possible through a mere release
from prospective royalties would not alone be great enough to justify
the risks and costs incurred.38 Also, it is submitted that any apparent
encouragement to tardy and marginal litigation would be further ener-
vated by the natural inclination of licensees to bring suit rather than
pay royalties when the patent initially appears vulnerable to challenge.
The argument for promoting early adjudication in patent litigation
should be placed in proper perspective. It should be noted that encourag-
ing early adjudication is a policy preference supportive of and ancillary
to the larger federal concern of promoting free and open markets and of
utilizing private litigation as a means of enforcing that end.39 Therefore,
if federal policy strongly encourages licensees to test patents of ques-
tionable legitimacy that might otherwise remain unwarranted restraints
upon competition, it is submitted that it should not be disregarded merely
because a possible side effect might be to lessen the pressure on disgruntled
licensees to litigate their claims promptly.
The circuit court also considered significant the hardship on patentee
licensors, and the consequential inhibiting effect on licensing likely to
occur if royalties were held recoverable upon a showing of patent
35. Id.
36. The court noted that the licensee, by bringing suit near the end of the
patent term, "would have a chance to regain all the royalties paid while never having
been subjected to the risk of an injunction." Id.
37. The average cost involved in litigating the validity of a patent is about$50,000. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 335 (1971).
38. Id. at 347-48. The Court stated:
[T]he outlay required to try a lawsuit presenting validity issues is the factor
which undoubtedly forces many alleged infringers into accepting licenses rather
than litigating.
Id. In the instant controversy, the timidity of Troxel in paying royalties upon demand
following the district court's finding of invalidity is perhaps understandable when the
low royalty payments demanded are contrasted to the probable costs of defending a
patent infringement action. See notes 2 & 37 supra.
39. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968),
wherein the Court stated:
[Tihe purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that ... private
action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business
behavior in violation of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 139.
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invalidity. 40 Even more important, in the circuit court's view, was the
possibility that the imposition of liability on patentees for past royalties
received might ultimately discourage the use of the patent system itself.
41
Too great a hardship imposed on patentees may induce inventors to keep
discoveries secret, and thus avoid the public disclosure required for
patent protection. 42 However, it is submitted that even a cursory evalua-
tion of trade secret law indicates that an inventor, if he seeks to capitalize
on his discovery, has little real alternative to utilization of the patent
system because trade secret protection is much more limited than the
government sanctioned monopoly afforded a valid patent.43 Hence, in-
ventors of legitimate discoveries will hardly be inhibited from seeking
patent protection. More spurious claims may well be discouraged, but
this would act to the benefit of an already overburdened patent system 44
and would be in consonance with the "free competition in ideas" mandate
of Lear.
45
The basis of the circuit court's conclusion as to the hardship im-
posed on patentees under the district court's interpretation of Lear was
the understanding that "patentability" is an elusive concept. 46 In light
of the uncertainty in application of the standards of patentability, the
court reasoned that it would be unfair to hold patentees responsible for
the errors of the Patent Office. 47 Thus, to the circuit court, a basic un-
fairness and misplacement of responsibility would result from requiring
licensors to refund royalties paid before the invalidation of the patent.
40. The court stated:
Under the decision of the District Court, any person who has licensed
would have a continuous cloud over . . . royalties . . . He would be compelled
to retain all royalties received in a relatively liquid state ....
465 F.2d at 1257-58.
41. Id. at 1258.
42. See note 12 supra.
43. One authority has stated:
It is axiomatic that, unlike a patentee who enjoys a 17 year period of
exclusivity, a trade secret owner has no rights against an independent subsequent
developer including one who copies matter marketed or otherwise made public
by the owner.
Milgrim, supra note 18, at 29.
44. See note 49 infra.
45. The history behind the Schwinn-Troxel license agreement is illustrative of
the dangers in allowing owners of questionable patents to exact their "tribute" for
ideas properly in the public domain. Schwinn used its patent offensively, seeking out
"infractors" who became licensees under the threat of suit. The licensees, in turn,
acted as policemen for Schwinn in enforcing the patent. See note 3 and text accom-
panying notes 1-3 supra. The ultimate link in the chain forges a circle when the
patentee uses the "commercial success" of widespread licensing as evidence of the
validity of the patent. Schwinn argued that point in urging the validity of its
patent. The district court acknowledged the relevance of the factor of commercial
success where patentability was a close question but refused to consider commercial
success where, as in the instant case, the patent was obviously invalid on other
grounds. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 U.S.P.Q. 587,
588 (N.D. Cal. 1969). While courts have generally considered commercial success
when determining patent validity, it is clear that "commercial success without in-
vention will not make patentability." Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153 (1950).
46. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
47. 465 F.2d at 1259.
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This overview of the problem, however, is overly sympathetic to
the position of the patentee. Due to the uncertainty of judicial acceptance
or a particular patent,48 blind reliance on a Patent Office issuance may not
be justified or reasonable. Therefore, to require a patentee to defend the
validity of a patent - and base his right to royalties on the result -
does not appear inequitable, and might well have a beneficial "tightening"
effect on the operation of the patent system.49 Additionally, the argu-
ment for justified reliance on the pronouncement of the Patent Office
works both ways. The circuit court decision would have the incongruous
result of penalizing a licensee for assuming the validity of a patent,
while excusing the patentee himself.50
In evaluating the position of licensee Troxel, the circuit court em-
phasized Troxel's indiligence in bringing suit:
Troxel could have challenged the patent initially instead of taking a
license. ... It waited for someone else to challenge the patent ...
Troxel . . . elected to remain a royalty-paying licensee. During all
this time it had the benefit of freedom from suit .... 51
However, the clear command of Lear was that when license agreements
are at issue, the equities of the parties and the usual rules of contract
law are to be evaluated in light of the overriding federal interest in pro-
moting free competition in ideas not protected by valid patents.5 2 It is
submitted that, in weighing the equities of the parties, focusing on a
perhaps undeserved advantage on the part of a licensee who had elected
not to challenge a patent rather than on the fact that the patentee has
enjoyed monopoly profits on an invalid patent is to ignore the priority of
this federal interest in discouraging unwarranted limits on competition.
In rejecting the district court's conclusions as to the applicability of
Lear, the Sixth Circuit fell back on its own long standing rule of eviction:
It has been the established rule in this Circuit for nearly forty
years that a final adjudication of invalidity operates as an eviction
48. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
49. Spurious patents are distressingly common. For an impressive list of patents
improvidently granted, see Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp.,
340 U.S. 147, 156-58 (1950).
Infusing a greater measure of private responsibility into the patent system
might well have a beneficial effect. The courts have been critical of the standards
applied by the Patent Office, and the problem is steadily becoming more serious as
both patent applications and the body of prior art which must be considered before
granting a patent increase yearly. See generally Brenner, The Challenges to the
Patent Systems in the 1970's, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 407, 410 (1971).
50. It should be noted that the circuit court also stated that the licensee's
equities are less compelling since royalties are typically passed on to consumers
through price increases. 465 F.2d at 1260. But see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) in which the "passing on" defense was
specifically rejected. In holding the defense unavailable to defendants in an antitrust
action, the Supreme Court noted: (1) the almost insurmountable difficulties of proof
in establishing, post hoc, the impact of a price increase on the total sales and general
economic condition of a business, and (2) that allowing such a defense would
enervate private enforcement of antitrust legislation by leaving only ultimate consumers
who may have but minimal interests with standing to bring suit. Id. at 492-94.
51. 465 F.2d at 1260.
52. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
MAY 1973]
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from the license, terminating the licensee's obligation to continue
making royalty payments after that date but giving no right to recoup
royalties already paid.53
Since the circuit court found the eviction doctrine expressed in Drackett
Chemical Co. v. Chamberlain Co. 54 controlling, it reversed and remanded,
instructing the district court to dismiss Troxel's complaint and claim for
royalties. Drackett was held unaffected by Lear, except to the extent it
expressed the doctrine of licensee estoppel. 55
However, it is submitted that by utilizing Drackett, the circuit court
ignored the holding of Lear that royalties accruing before a final finding
of patent invalidity (and the corresponding eviction of the license agree-
ment) were not due the patentee.56 Under the eviction rule, the licensee
remains liable for royalties which accrued before the effective destruction
of the bargained for patent monopoly. 57 Therefore, if the Lear Court
had utilized the theory of eviction, the patentee in Lear would have been
entitled to all royalties accruing prior to the finding of patent invalidity.
Instead, Lear clearly bypassed the eviction doctrine - at least where the
royalties are contested and unpaid - by holding that public policy requires
royalties once due need not be paid upon a subsequent finding of in-
validity. Thus, the arguments made by the circuit court5" should be viewed
with the understanding that the only open question remaining after Lear
was whether a licensee who has paid royalties should be treated differently
than one who has not paid. Lear already had precluded the applicability
of the eviction doctrine where the royalties are contested and unpaid.
It is submitted that in light of the public interest in free markets
and the short service Lear and Blonder-Tongue gave to the technical
requirements of contract doctrine when in conflict with that interest, the
distinction maintained by the circuit court between the defensive retention
and offensive recovery of royalties is both anomolous and arbitrary.
The rationale of Lear, albeit articulated in a case involving unpaid
royalties, is no less compelling in the situation where royalties have been
paid. On policy grounds, the inhibition of competition occasioned by the
existence of an invalid patent is hardly lessened by the fact that royalties
53. 465 F.2d at 1255, citing Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853(6th Cir. 1933). The eviction rule is a contract defense arising from the completefailure of consideration occasioned by a judicial finding of patent invalidity. See 6
S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, §§ 814, 815 (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1962). In some jurisdictions, even a lower court finding of invalidity evicts
a license agreement. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research,176 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1949). Other jurisdictions, including the Sixth Circuit,
require the decision to be final and no longer appealable before an eviction occurs,
apparently to avoid the unauthorized use which is likely in the event of the subsequent
finding of validity on appeal. See, e.g., Appleton Toy & Furniture Co. v. Lehman Co.,
165 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853
(6th Cir. 1933).
54. 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1933). See note 53 supra.
55. 465 F.2d at 1260.
56. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
57. See note 53 srupra.
58. See notes 31-36, 40, 42, 46-47 and accompanying text .upra.
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were paid rather than contested; regarding equitable principles, the act of
payment does not bestow on the patentee any right to receive royalties
for an invalid patent nor does it render such royalties any less an unwar-
ranted burden on the licensee. Indeed, the logic of the eviction doctrine
itself is inconsistent with such a differentiation.59
In conclusion, Troxel can perhaps best be characterized as an unfor-
tunate deviation from the spirit of Lear. Disallowing a recovery for
royalties paid upon an invalid patent appears inconsistent with both the
federal policy favoring competitive markets and the federal strategy of
encouraging private litigation as a means of enforcing this public prefer-
ence. The reasoning of Troxel, however, has been mirrored on at least
one other occasion,60 and it seems likely that until the Supreme Court
considers the issue specifically, the courts may hesitate to order recoveries
for licensees in such situations.
Richard B. Hardt
59. The crux of the eviction doctrine is not that royalties are unrecoverable
per se, but rather that no right to recover exists as to royalties accruing before the
"eviction," i.e., while the contract was still valid. A licensee under the eviction
theory has an undisputed right to recover paid royalties which accrued after the
eviction of the patent. See, e.g., Wynne v. Aluminum Awning Prods. Co., 148 F. Supp.
212 (M.D.N.C. 1952). Thus, the eviction rule rests not upon an offensive-defensive
distinction, but rather upon the point in time at which the liability of the licensor
is terminated.
60. See Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc., 340 F. Supp.
1385 (N.D. Ill. 1972), wherein the court stated:
I find no expression in either Lear or Blonder-Tongue which would create
an independent cause of action in a licensee permitting the recovery of royalties
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